分析师对基金重仓股发布乐观预测的后果研究——来自佣金分仓的证据

A Study on the Consequences of Analysts' Optimistic Forecasts for Heavily-held Stocks:Evidence from Trading Commission Fees

选取2010—2015年分析师盈利预测、基金重仓持股和基金向券商支付的佣金数据研究分析师对基金公司重仓股发布乐观盈利预测的后果,发现分析师对基金公司重仓股发布乐观盈利预测次数越多,基金公司向该分析师所在券商支付的交易佣金越多。进一步的研究发现:分析师对重仓的冷门股发布乐观预测以及越早发布乐观预测,能提高基金公司对券商的分仓佣金;小规模基金公司通过佣金分仓回报券商分析师讨好的成分更大;基金公司通过提高交易量的方式向券商支付更多交易佣金;利益冲突是导致分析师行为异化的原因。

Selecting analyst＇s earnings forecasts from 2010 to 2015, heavily-held stocks and data on commission paid to securi- ties traders by fund firms, this paper makes a research on the consequences of analysts＇ optimistic earnings forecast for heavily- held stocks by fund firms. The research shows that the more times the analysts issue optimistic earnings forecast for stocks held by fund firms, the more commission the fund will pay to the firm＇s analysts. Further research finds that the earlier optimistic forecasts for unpopular stocks heavily held by fund firms and more timely optimistic forecasts made by analysts could increase commissions and sub-positions paid by fund firms to securities traders. This phenomenon is more obvious in small-sized fund firms. Finally, the fund firms pay more commissions to securities traders by means of increasing the volume of transactions; Interest conflict is the cause of dissimilation of analysts＇ behavior.