机构投资者、上市公司治理与国有企业改革——基于“宝万之争”的案例研究

Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance and the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises——Based on the Case Study of "Fight Between Vanke and Baoneng "

从2015年12月爆发的"宝万之争",到2016年8月初"恒大系"的强势介入以及2017年6月的退出,再到央企背景的华润与深圳国资背景的深圳地铁之间的股权更替,结局渐进清晰,然而引发的争论和思考却久久不能平息。上市企业到底是谁的,高管团队的创业者精神与股东利益如何平衡,股权结构如何设立更为合理,机构投资者尤其是具备多层委托代理关系的公募基金如何更好地发挥上市公司治理有效性,上市公司党委如何更好的发挥作用。究其本质,"宝万之争"属于典型的公司治理问题,意义深远,尤其对此阶段国有企业深化改革尤其是混改进程中具有十分重要的借鉴意义。论文对上述问题进行分析,并提出相关政策建议。

From the ＂Fight Between Vanke and Baoneng＂ outbroke in December 2015 to the the strong involvement of＂Hengda system＂ in August 2016 and its exit in June 2017, then to the equity replacementit between China Resources （Holdings） Co.Ltd. with the background of central enterprises and Shenzhen Metro with Shenzhen state-owned asset background, now, the issue has finally come to an end, while the influence still remains. Whose is the listed companies？ How to balance the entrepreneurial spirit and the shareholder＇s interests in an executive team？ How to set up a more reasonable equity structure？ How can the public offering fund of institutional investors, especially those with multi-level principal-agent relationship, play a more effective role in the governance of listed companies？ How can the party committees of listed companies play a better role？ In essence, ＂Fight Between Vanke and Baoneng＂ is a typical corporate governance problem, with great significance, this issue can be used as a reference for deepening the diversification of the reform process of state-owned enterprises. In this article, we will investigate into these matters and provide suggestions for relative policies.