管理层持股对股价信息影响研究——基于中国非金融类A股上市公司的证据

A Study in the relationship between Management Shareholdings and Stock Price informativeness——Based on the Empirical Data from Chinese Non-financial A-share Listed Companies

股价信息含量是个股股价对企业特质信息的反映程度,股价信息含量关系着资本市场定价效率、优化资源配置,相应地,研究股价信息含量的动因、探讨如何促进股价信息含量显得十分必要。管理层是企业经营和信息披露的决策制定者,管理层的激励机制影响了其决策行为。给予管理层股权激励能否将管理层利益与股东利益协同起来,提升企业股价的信息含量则是本文的研究问题。本文采用理论分析和实证研究方法,基于2013-2014年中国非金融类A股上市数据,研究了管理层持股对股价信息含量的影响。研究发现,管理层持股显著提升了股价信息含量,提高了资本市场的定价效率。

Stock Price Informativeness due to firm-specific information. Stock reflects that to which extent the change of share price is Price Informativeness is critical for pricing efficiency of capital market and resource allocation efficiency. Therefore, it is necessary to research on the drivers of Stock price information and the methods to promote Stock Price Informaiveness. Management isresponsible for information disclosure and decision-making, which is affected by incentive systems. This thesis mainly focuses on whether management equity incentive contributes to improve Stock Price Informativeness and helps to achieve goal congruence between management and shareholders. Theoretical approach and empirical approach are adopted in this study. Based on the data of Chinese non-financial A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2014, this thesis analyses the correlation between management shareholding and Stock Price Informativeness. The result suggests that management shareholding significantly improves Stock Price Informativeness as well as pricing efficiency of capital market.