民企党组织参与公司治理:获取外部资源还是提升内部效率?——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据

Party Organizations Participating in Private Corporate Governance:Obtaining External Resources or Enhancing Internal Efficiency?——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Private Listed Companies

随着民营经济的不断壮大,民营企业的党建工作逐步推进,党组织参与民营企业治理日益普遍。文章利用2008~2014年民营上市公司党组织治理数据,使用倾向得分匹配(PSM)方法,检验民企党组组织的治理效用。实证结果发现民企党组织参与公司治理具有外部效应,但内部效应并不显著。具体而言,民企董事长或总经理兼任党组织成员有利于企业获取外部资源,但不能降低公司代理成本。进一步的研究发现民企党组织的治理效应主要依靠董事长兼任党组织成员实现,总经理兼任党组织成员对企业获取外部资源的帮助并不显著,董事长和总经理二职合一并不利于治理效应的发挥。研究结论为党组织有效地参与公司治理提供了相应的建议,推动了非公党建的理论研究。

With the rapid growth of private economy, the work of party organizations in private companies is gradually a d v an c in g, and more and more party organizations are participating in the corporate governance. Based on data of private listed companies in 2008-2014, the article uses propensity score matching （PSM） method to test the effectiveness of party organizations participating private corporate governance. The empirical results show that party organizations participating in corporate governance has external governance effect, but the internal governance effect is not significant. Specifically, the chairman or general manager o f private companies a s members of the party organizations are conducive to obtain external resources, but this may not reduce the corporate agency cos ts . Further study finds that the governance effect mainly depends on the chairman serving as party members, while general manager serving as party members may not help companies to obtain external resources, and chairman serving as general manager is not conducive to the governance effect. The conclusions of the article offer some advices for party organizations effectively participating in corporate governance thus promote the theoretical research of the party organizations in private companies.