基于定价决策的平台型供应链金融利益协调机制——以Nafin平台为例

Research on Interest Coordination Mechanism of Platform-Led Supply Chain Finance based on the Pricing Decision——A Case Study of Nafin Platform

以Nafin反向保理平台中的核心企业与供应商之间的利益协调问题为背景,运用鲁宾斯轮流讨价还价博弈思想,针对平台型供应链金融中核心企业与供应商围绕交货价格的再定价问题,构建双方轮流讨价还价博弈模型。分析了核心企业与供应商的最优定价决策,从定价角度探讨了平台型供应链金融的利益协调机制。最后,案例分析了Nafin平台的定价问题及相应的利益分配。

Under the background of interest coordination between the core enterprise and the supplier in the Nafin reverse factoring platform, this paper applies Rubens rotational bargaining game theory to construct the rotational bargaining game model aiming at the re-pricing of the deliveries between the core enterprise and the supplier of the platform-led supply chain finance. The optimal pricing deci-sions of the core enterprise and the supplier are analyzed, and the benefit coordination mechanism of the platform-led supply chain finance is discussed from the angle of pricing. Finally, it analyzes a pricing case of the Nafin platform and the corresponding distribution of benefits.