会计信息质量与企业的商业信用融资——基于未解释审计费用度量的实证研究

Accounting Information Quality and Firms' Commercial Credits——Empirical Study Based on Unexpected Auditing Fees

商业信用的获取和供给受到企业间信息不对称的制约,而会计信息披露则有助于监督企业运营和缓解信息不对称。本文利用未解释审计费用衡量会计信息质量,探讨了中国上市企业的会计信息质量对商业信用获取和供给的影响效应,并分析此影响效应在不同企业性质、市场地位及政府干预下的差异性。实证研究表明,高质量的会计信息能直接促进企业获取商业信用,并通过外源融资间接增加商业信用的供给,此现象在国有企业中表现得尤为明显。同时,市场优势地位能够增强高质量会计信息的国有企业对商业信用的边际获取能力。此外,地方政府的干预也能改善高质量会计信息的国有企业对商业信用和外源融资的边际获取能力,但减弱了其对商业信用的边际供给能力。

The gain and supply of commercial credit are restricted to information asymmetry between firms. Accounting information disclosure can help stakeholders learn firms＇ performance and alleviate the information asymmetry between firms. This paper adopts unexpected auditing fees to measure accounting information quality, discusses whether accounting information quality could induce the gain and supply of commercial credit of listed firms in China, and analyzes the different impact of the firm ownership, market status and government intervention. The results show that the accounting information quality could facilitate firms to gain commercial credit directly, while it could indirectly induce firms to supply commercial credits by assisting firms to increase external finance. This phenomenon is especially obvious in state-owned firms. Moreover, the state-owned firms with high market position have the powerful marginal ability to gain commercial credit. In addition, the intervention of local government could also enhance the ability of state-owned firms with high accounting information quality to obtain commercial credit and external financing but weaken its marginal supply capacity for commercial credit.