从方偏好信息不完全时的激励机制研究

On the Incentive Mechanism with the Follower ?s Preference Unknown to Leader

研究了当从方具有多个目标且主方没有掌握从方对各目标的偏好结构信息时的主从对策问题；提出了从方具有多个目标时诱导策略的有效性概念，讨论了鼓励从方上报真实偏好结构信息的激励相容机制和主方的满意激励机制．

The Stackelberg game when the follower has multiple objectives and his preferred structural information is unknown to the leader is studied. The concept of the effectiveness of the optimal incentive strategy of the leader is proposed. The incentive compatible mechanism for the follower to report his true preferred structural information during gaming is investigated. The satisfactory mechanism for the leader is also discussed.