煤矿应急协作的演化博弈及仿真分析

Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Emergency Cooperation of Coal Mines

采用演化博弈论和数值仿真方法,引入应急协作的救援收益、救援收益增量、收益增量分配系数、违约金、机会主义所得及先期成本等效益因子,构建了煤矿应急救援中多主体协作的行为博弈模型。通过分析各效益因子对煤矿企业达成应急协作可能性的影响,探讨了不同企业之间进行协作的策略选择。研究发现:若企业双方不协作时的净机会主义所得均大于协作后的额外救援净收益,此时双方博弈结果均趋向于不协作,反之则双方均趋向于协作;企业双方选择协作的几率与救援收益增量、收益增量分配系数的合理配置及违约金呈正相关关系,与先期协作成本和机会主义所得呈负相关关系。

The behavior game model of multi-agent cooperation in the emergency rescue of the coal mine was constructed by using the evolutionary game theory and the numerical simulation method and introducing the rescue earnings of the emergency cooperation,the increment of the rescue earnings,the distribution coefficient of the earning increment,and the benefit factors such as the liquidated damages,opportunistic gains and upfront costs. Through the analysis of the influence of each benefit factor on the possibility of the coal enterprise reaching the emergency cooperation,the strategy selection of the cooperation among different enterprises was discussed. It was found in research that if the net opportunistic gains of two enterprises from non-cooperation were all greater than the net earnings of the additional rescue from the cooperation,the game results of both sides tented to non-cooperation,on the contrary,both sides tented to cooperation; the cooperation selection probability among coal enterprises presented a positive correlation with the increment of the rescue earnings,the reasonable allocation of the distribution coefficient of the earning increment and the liquidated damages,and a negative correlation with the early cooperation costs and the opportunistic gains.