基于博弈论的C2B2C模式下电商信用监管机制研究

Designing credit supervision mechanism in C2B2C e-commerce based on game theory

由于商户与消费者间的信息不对称性,电商失信问题日益突出.对此,作为电子商务的主要媒介,电商平台的信用监管职责不容忽视.在C2C电子商务模式中,引入电商平台为第三方信用监管方以形成C2B2C电子商务模式,并设计C2B2C电商信用监管机制,包括:保证金收取机制,信用监管机制,失信惩罚机制等.基于博弈理论,构建了C2B2C电子商务模式下的演化博弈模型与双价交易模型,对电商和消费者双方的长期交易策略进行了分析,其结果表明:提高信用保证金、增强信用监管力度、增加伪装成本能有效避免电商失信行为,减少消费者在电子商务交易中的风险.

Due to the information asymmetry between merchants and consumers in e-commerce markets, credit default has become an increasingly serious problem. As the major media in e-commerce, transaction platforms should take an important role in the credit supervision mechanism. A new C2B2C e-commerce can be extended from the typical C2C e-commerce by incorporating the transaction platform as a third party of credit supervision mechanism, in which security deposit policy, supervision policy and punishment policy are elaborately designed. Based on the evolutionary game model and the bivalent trading game model, the long-term trading strategies of merchants and consumers in the C2B2C e-commerce are inves- tigated. The results indicate that enhancing security deposit, supervision strength and disguising cost will effectively avoid credit default in e-commerce.