裁量与裁量收缩——一个宪法、行政法结合部问题

Discretion and the Reduction of Discretion:An Overlapping Problem between Constitutional Law and Administrative Law

行政裁量权的收缩是一个处于宪法和行政法结合部的问题。尽管此问题具有重大实践意义,但在学界未获充分重视。裁量收缩根源于事实和法律因素的结合作用。裁量收缩至行政机关的作为(或者以特定方式作为)和裁量收缩至行政机关的不作为(或者不以特定方式作为)存在显著区别。对于裁量收缩问题必须采取一种严格主义的立场。只有在若无裁量的收缩防卫性基本权或者宪法上的保护义务无法在最低限度上得到保障的情形中,裁量的收缩才是正当的。有观点认为,在警察法和公共秩序法中,侵害达到中等程度之时,裁量收缩至零便可成立,甚至认为,在建设法规制的特定种类的情形中,裁量收缩至零是常态。本文作者驳斥了上述观点。

The reduction of decisionmakers＇ discretionary powers（Ermessensreduktion）is a legal concept which lies at the interface of constitutional and administrative law,and which,though hitherto somewhat neglected in the legal literature,is of considerable practical importance.A reduction of discretion arises from a combination of circumstantial and legal factors.A clear distinction exists between a reduction of discretion which obliges the administration to act（or to act in a particular way）,and a reduction of discretion which obliges the administration to refrain form acting（or to refrain from acting in a particular wag）.Reductions of discretion should be construed restrictively.A reduction of discretion is only valid if,without it,defensive basic rights or constitutional duty of protection could not be preserved at the required minimum standard.It has been suggested that administrative discretion is diminished to the point of elimination（Ermessensredution auf Null）in the law governing police powers and public order and safety once a ＂medium-intensity＂disturbance is present,or even,in certain classes of case governed by building regulations,that this elimination exists as a general rule.The authors reject these suggestions.