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基于0.1π旋转相位Grover算法的ECC电压毛刺攻击算法 被引量:6

ECC fault attack algorithm based on Grover's quantum search algorithm with 0.1π phase rotation
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摘要 将Grover算法应用到对公钥密码的故障攻击中,提出一种基于固定相位旋转Grover量子算法,当旋转相位为0.1π时,仿真实验搜索成功率提高到99.23%。进一步与故障攻击结合,提出基于0.1π旋转相位Grover算法的椭圆曲线密码电压毛刺攻击算法,仿真实验以100%的概率攻击了NIST公布的Koblitz安全曲线K-163,其计算复杂度呈指数级降低。这是除Shor算法之外量子计算对公钥密码的一种新的有效攻击途径,有助于拓展量子计算对其他公钥密码体制的攻击。 The Grover,s algorithm was used for fault attack against the public key cryptography. A fixed phase rotation based Grover,s algorithm was proposed, and the probability of success achieved 99.23% with 0.1n phase rotation. Com-bined with the fault attack further, ECC (elliptic curve cryptography) voltage burr attack algorithm based on Grover algo-rithm with 0.1n phase rotation was proposed. Then a safety Koblitz curve, K-163, published successfully attacked by NIST on binary domain in simulation and the success rate was 100%. The complexity of the attack greatly reduces on the exponential. It was a new effective way, except the Shor,s algorithm, to attack public key cryptography by quantum computing, and it contributed to extend the attack ways to the other public key cryptography.
出处 《通信学报》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2017年第8期1-8,共8页 Journal on Communications
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(No.61572304 No.61272096 No.61332019)~~
关键词 量子搜索算法 GROVER算法 相位匹配 量子计算 电压毛刺攻击 quantum search algorithm, Grover,s algorithm, phase matching, quantum computing, voltage burr attack
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