产权性质、管理层背景特征与财务冗余——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

On Nature of Property Right, Background Feature of Management and Financial Slack——On Basis of Experimental Experience from China's Securities Market

组织理论认为,管理层利用财务冗余革新,有助于公司绩效提升;而代理理论却认为,财务冗余诱发管理层自利,有损公司绩效。但既有文献忽略了管理者的异质性,把管理者视为同质的。以高层梯队理论为视角,揭示不同产权性质管理层背景特征对财务冗余的影响。研究发现:管理层年龄及任期与财务冗余之间呈正相关;管理层规模与财务冗余之间呈负相关;管理层性别与财务冗余之间不显著;但国有公司与非国有公司管理层背景特征与财务冗余之间存在明显差异。

According to the organizational theory, financial slack may be made use of by themanagement to promote firm performance, while according to the agency theory, it may lead to theselfishness of the management so as to destroy firm performance. However, in both cases theheterogeneity of the managers is neglected and too much attention is paid to their homogeneity. On thebasis of Upper Echelons Theory, an analysis is made of the influence of the background feature ofmanagement on financial slack, anda conclusion is reached of the relationship between the managementand financial slack.