媒体关注、内部控制与真实活动盈余管理

Media Coverage, Internal Control and Real Activity Earnings Management

本文以2012-2014年沪市A股非金融类上市公司为数据样本,分析了内部控制和媒体关注对我国上市公司真实活动盈余管理的治理作用,并探讨这两种内外治理机制发挥作用的方式。研究结果表明:媒体关注和内部控制均能有效抑制企业真实活动盈余管理;结合我国特殊制度背景,进一步研究发现,在非国有企业和市场化程度较低的地区,媒体关注和内部控制在发挥抑制作用的过程中存在互补关系,二者的共同治理能更有效地抑制企业盈余管理行为。

Taking non-financial companies listed on the A-share market of Shanghai Stock Exchange during 2012 to 2014 as data sample, this article is aimed to study the governance function of media coverage as well as internal control in terms of real activity earnings management for domestic listed companies, and further analyses how these two internal and external governance mechanisms operate.This results show that media coverage and internal control can effectively inhibit the real earnings management. Through further research based on China's special regime, it is found that in non state-owned enterprises and areas of relative low marketization, media coverage and internal control are mutual complementary in the process of restraining, and the corporate governance of these two factors makes company's earnings management restrain more effectively.