摘要
由于拒绝回答"自由意志是否存在"的原初问题,哈耶克不仅重蹈了西方主流学界坚持"自由"与"必然"二元对立架构的覆辙,而且还凭借自己的规范性价值偏好,扭曲了"自由"与"强制"互动的实然性特征,在把"自由"理解成"强制之不存在"的同时,又将"强制"视为限制"自由"的否定性之恶,没有看到它同时还具有确保"自由"的肯定性效应,结果在一系列自相矛盾中陷入了自败的泥潭,最终导致他认同的"自由意志主义"存在着深度的悖论。
Due to refusing to answer the original question of whether or not the free - will exists, Hayek recommits the same error of the fixed dichotomical structure between freedom and necessity held by mainstream Western philosophy, and seriously distorts the factual relationship betweem freedom and coercion in virtue of his own normative stance. By defining ＂freedom＂ as the ＂absence of coercion＂ and regarding ＂coercion＂ merely as the evil of negating ＂freedom＂, he fails to indicate the positive function of ＂coercion＂ to guarantee ＂freedom＂, with the result that his ＂liberatarian＂ doctrine eventully falls into some self - defeating paradox in a series of logical self - contraditions
出处
《兰州学刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第9期83-95,共13页
