政治周期、政府补贴和产能过剩

Political cycles、Government subsidies and Excess production capacity

本文检验了中国特有的政治周期——省级党代会和企业过剩产能之间的关系。发现在党代会召开的当年及之后两年,企业的过剩产能生成和银行贷款显著增加。本文还发现企业累积过剩产能越多,政府给予补贴越多。证据表明,地方政府官员对辖区企业的过度投资进行了机会主义的干预,以利于其政治晋升;而政府补贴弱化了企业出清过剩产能的内在动力,使过剩产能日渐积累。本文为我国过剩产能现象提供了较完整的微观解释框架,为地方政府干预造成产能过剩提供了新的微观领域证据。

Using China＇ s specific political cycles---local Party Congress, we investigate local government＇ s timing policy of in- tervention to local companies＇ excess production capacity. We find that the overinvestment and bank loans of local companies significantly increases in the Party Congress year and the subsequent two years. Further, We find that the more a company ac- cumulates overinvestment, the more subsidies they get from local government. The evidence proves that local government offi- cials intervene local companies＇ overinvestment timely to in favor of their political promotion. The evidence also supports that government subsidies maintains the overinvestment companies＇ operation, weakening their internal impetus of clearing excess capacity, which makes the excess production capacity accumulating continuously. Our study provides a complete interpretation framework to China＇ s excess production capacity and provides microscopic evidences to local government＇s intervention which making excess production capacity.