地方官员变更与外资专用性投资——基于中国省际面板数据的实证研究

Local Governors' Turnover and Foreign Specific Investment:Empirical Study Base on China's Provincial Panel Data

官员变更会引起企业投资支出的减少,然而,已有文献并未研究官员变更对外资专用性投资的影响。文章利用手工搜集的1997-2014年我国FDI结构的省际面板数据,考察了地方官员变更对外资专用性投资行为的影响。研究结果表明:地方官员变更引起辖区内政治不确定程度增加,显著地降低当年的外资专用性投资规模。相对于省委书记发生变更,省长发生变更对该地区外资专用性投资的影响更显著。与合资和合作两种利用外资形式相比,独资形式的外资专用性投资显然更易受到地方官员变更的负向影响。文章为不确定性与外资投资的研究提供了新的视角,并丰富了官员变更的相关文献。

This paper examines the impact of local officials change on for- eign-specific investment behavior by using the provincial panel data of foreign in- vestment in China from 1997 to 2014. The empirical results show that, the change of political officials causes the increase of the degree of political uncer- tainty in the jurisdiction, and significantly reduces the scale of foreign specific in- vestment. Also, the change of provincial governor＇s influence on the foreign in- vestment is more significant than that of the secretary of the provincial Party committee. Although the changes of the chief officials will reduce the scale of foreign-specific investment in the current year, the scale of foreign-specific invest- ment will increase in the second year of the change. This paper provides a new perspective for the study of uncertainty and foreign investment and enriches the official turnover literature.