渐进式转型经济中的国有企业监管:理论框架和中国实践

State-Owned Enterprises' Supervision in Gradual Transition Economies:Theoretical Framework and China's Practice

转型经济中政府对国有企业运营的深度参与,造成了国有企业监管中的多重委托代理问题。本文研究了渐进式转型国家中,国有企业监管体制的选择问题:监管体制能够影响监管者的激励和约束;集中监管体制在激励监管者上具有优势,而分散监管体制在防止监管俘获上具有优势;监管体制和市场结构的错配会导致监管的低效;随着转型国家市场竞争程度的提高,委托人可从分散监管体制到集中监管体制的转变中获益。中国的典型化事实和经验证据能够支持本文的理论假说。

In gradual transition countries,the government’s deep involvement in the operation of SOEs gives rise to multi-principal-agent problem. This paper investigates the problem of optimal supervision regimes for supervising the state sector in gradual transition economies. It argues that the supervision regime can influence supervisor’s incentives and constraints： an integrated regime has advantage in motivating supervisors,while a separated regime has advantage in preventing supervisors from being captured by SOEs. Furthermore,the combination of supervision regime and market structure will affect supervision efficiency. A mismatch between market structure and supervision regime would lead to SOEs’ low efficiency. As market competition increases,the principal benefits in switching from the separated to the integrated supervision regime. Stylized facts and empirical evidence from China support our hypotheses.