董事长与CEO任期交错治理效用分析——基于抑制股价崩盘风险视角的实证研究

The Corporate Governance Effect of Tenure Heterogeneity of Chairman and CEO:An Empirical Analysis from the Perspective of Curbing Stock Price Crash Risk

管理团队任期的异质性导致管理层成员之间产生价值目标差异,董事长与CEO任期交错可以缓解代理问题,避免无效投资的发生。本文以股价崩盘风险为视角分析董事长与CEO任期交错的公司治理效用,并比较不同情景下其治理效果的强弱。研究发现董事长与CEO任期交错可以抑制股价崩盘风险,大股东持股会影响董事长与CEO任期交错与股价崩盘风险之间的关系;当大股东持股比例较高时,二者任期交错对股价崩盘风险无抑制作用;当大股东持股比例较低时,其对股价崩盘风险的抑制效果明显;企业的产权性质会影响董事长与CEO任期交错对股价崩盘风险的抑制作用,该效果在国有企业中比较显著,但在民营企业中并不显著。这表明董事长与CEO任期交错具有正面的治理作用,但该作用的发挥具有情景效应。

Heterogeneity of tenure of top management team leads to value goal difference between managers, and tenure heterogeneity of the chairman and CEO can alleviate the agency problem and avoid the happening of ineffective investment. From the perspective of stock price crash risk, the paper inspects the influence of tenure heterogeneity of chairman and CEO on corporate governance, and compares the strength of its governance effect in the different situations. Research finds that tenure heterogeneity of chairman and CEO can inhibit stock price crash risk and major shareholders holdings will affect the relation between tenure heterogeneity of chairman and CEO and stock price crash risk; when the major shareholders holdings is high, the relation between tenure heterogeneity of chairman and CEO and stock price crash risk is not significant; when the major shareholders holdings is low, tenure heterogeneity of chairman and CEO has great inhibitory effect on stock price crash risk, which is significant in state-owned enterprises, but is net remarkable in the pri- vately owned enterprises. This suggests that tenure heterogeneity of chairman and CEO has a positive role in governance, but its role has context effect.