美国在古巴导弹危机中的情报失误——从组织理论视角对《国家情报评估》的分析

US Intelligence Failures in the Cuban Missile Crisis: a Study of National Intelligence Estimate from the Perspective of Organization Theory

[目的/意义]古巴导弹危机是20世纪人类社会最重大的事件之一。窥探美国在古巴导弹危机中情报评估工作的得失,有助于我们理解和把握当今国际局势,为今后在类似危机的预警、处置等方面处于主动地位提供有益经验。[方法/过程]以古巴导弹危机中美国的情报工作出现了失误为前提,对危机爆发前的4份《国家情报评估》进行文本和背景分析,试图从组织的角度对国家情报评估出现的情报失误进行解释和说明。[结果/结论]通过研究认为,古巴导弹危机爆发前的国家情报评估之所以与事实产生了重大偏差,组织因素在其中起到了相当大的作用。这次危机给美国情报界带来了深刻的教训,也为后来国家情报评估制度的改革埋下了伏笔。

[ Purpose/Significance ] Cuban Missile Crisis is one of the most significant events in the 20th century. A close examination on the successes and failures of the American intelligence evaluation on the Cuban Missile Crisis is helpful for us to understand and judge the international situation today and provide useful experience for the active earlywarning and management of similar crisis. [ Method/ Process] Set in the background of the American intelligence failures in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the present paper analyzes the four Na- tional Intelligence Estimate texts and background, attempting to illustrate and explain the intelligence failures recorded in them from the perspective of organization. [ Result/Conclusion ] The research finds out that the reason why there was a significant deviation in the National Intelligence Estimate from the facts before the outburst of the Cuban Missile Crisis lies in the organization factors. The crisis has taught the American Intelligence a profound lesson, which in turn foreshadowed the later reform on the American national intelligence evaluation system.