高送转股利政策真的是套现“工具”吗?--来自A股市场的经验证据

Is High Stock Dividends Really the Instrument of Stock Sales ? Empirical Evidenve from the A-share Market

2017年金融监管的全面升级使得高送转分红一时间从市场的"香饽饽"沦为备受质疑的"烫手山芋"。文章基于2007-2015年A股上市公司数据,综合运用PSM、IV-Probit模型等计量方法对高送转是否促进了股票套现进行实证分析。研究发现:(1)企业实施高送转相比于其反事实的非高送转方案存在明显的超额收益,从而为股票套现创造了有利条件,并且在有过减持行为的子样本中收益更高。(2)在有效控制了反向因果的内生性问题后,大股东和高管的股票减持套现行为使得高送转的可能性出现了显著的正向提升,表明高送转背后隐藏着企业内部人有意识地利用了投资者的非理性偏好来实现自身理性的套现自利动机,即高送转具有"工具"性质,继而印证了"股票解禁-高送转-减持套现"的利益实现路径。(3)进一步分析表明二者间的关系还存在市场特征异质性,在牛市行情阶段及创业板为代表的中小创板块中,高送转配合套现的"工具"性质更为明显。本文从利益驱动视角为我国监管部门遏制高送转乱象提供了有力的经验证据,并据此提出一系列的政策建议。

The overall upgrade of financial regulation in 2017 has made high stock dividends come down from the popular to the hot potato which is fully questioned. Based on the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2015, this paper empirically examines whether the high stock dividends promotes the behavior of stock sales by comprehensively using econometdc methods such as PSM and IV-Probit model It ardves at the following conclusions： firstly, enterpdses which implement the high stock dividends have notable abnormal return than counterfactual enterprises without high stock dividends, and the earning is much higher than the sub sample of those which include shares-selling behavior; secondly, after effectively solving the endogeneity problem of the reverse rausality, the executives and major shareholders＇ behavior of shares selling makes the possibility of high stock dividends give rise to a significantly positive improvement, which indicates that some insiders consciously take advantage of investors＇ irrational preferences to achieve their rational self-interest motivations like stock sales in the case of high stock dividends, namely high stock dividends has the feature of instrument. The path of interest realization as ＂Ban lifting of restricted stock--high stock dividends--shares selling＂ has aslo been proved afterwards; thirdly, further analysis shows that the relationship between the two has market-featured heterogeneity, In the stage of bull market and in the GEM board, such feature of instrument is more significant as implementing high stock dividends for the purpose of stock sales. This paper provides a reliable empirical evidence from the interest- driven perspective for regulatory authorities to curb the chaos of high stock dividends, and It proposes a series of policy recommendations accordingly,