不同批发价格谈判模式与渠道权力结构下的双渠道供应链博弈研究——基于营销努力视角

A Game Analysis of Dual-channel Supply Chain under Different Wholesale Price Bargaining Modes and Channel Power Structures: Based on Marketing Effort

考虑双渠道供应链成员在批发价格制定过程中的讨价还价问题以及在供应链中权力的差异问题,基于批发价格制定的两种谈判基准和供应链的三种渠道权力结构,构建销售价格和营销努力共同影响需求的六种博弈模型,通过博弈模型分析得到两种批发价格谈判模式和三种渠道权力结构下的最优渠道定价策略。研究发现:相比于制造商营销努力,零售商营销努力对渠道定价和利润的影响受到更多因素的制约;制造商与零售商均愿意作为跟随方发挥后动优势;当网络直销渠道市场份额较低时,制造商与零售商偏好于以对方销售价格为基准的批发价格谈判模式,当网络直销渠道市场份额较高时,二者偏好于以自身销售价格为基准的批发价格谈判模式。

Considering the issue of w h o l e s a l e price b a r g a i n i n g a n d p o w e r difference b e t w e e n d u a l - c h a n n e l s u p p l y chain members,this paper builds six game m o d e l s b a s e d o n t w o w h o l e s a l e price negotiation b e n c h m a r k s a n d three channel power structures. I n the model,t he demand is sensitive to b o t h m a r k e t i n g effort a n d sale p r i c e. B y solving the mathematic models,the o p t i m a l pricing policies of m a n u f a c t u r e r a n d retailer are o b t a i n e d in the t w o wholesale price bargaining modes and in the three c h a n n e l p o w e r structures. O n this b a s i s,w e investigate the in-fluence of marketing effort on channel pricing t h r o u g h the m a t h e m a t i c a l derivation a n d discuss the i m p a c t of m a r -keting effort for manufacturer＇s and retailer＇s profits t h r o u g h n u m e r i c a l analysis. F i n a l l y,w e p o i n t e d o ut the pref-erence of manufacturer and retailer on w h o l e s a l e price b a r g a i n i n g m o d e a n d c h a n n e l p o w e r structure c o m b i n e d with the results of the profit comparison. Res u l t s s h ow t h a t： c o m p a r e d w i t h the i n fluence of m a n u f a c t u r e r ＇ s m a r -keting effort on channel pricing and profit,the i m p a c t of retailer＇ m a r k e t i n g effort is c o n s t r a i n e d b y m o r e factors; both the manufacturer and the retailer are willing to b e followers a n d p l a y l a t e - m o v e r a d v a n t a g e s; the m a n u f a c t u r-er and the retailer tend to adopt the w h o l e s a l e price negotiation w i t h other＇s selling price as b e n c h m a r k in c a s e of the market share of direct online channel is low, a n d b o t h of t h e m w o u l d prefer their o w n sales price as b e n c h-mark in case of the market sha r e of direct o nline c h a n n e l is h i g h.