论唯物主义认识论中的知觉问题——如何理解《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》第一条

On Perception of Materialist Epistemology:How to Interpret Marx's ″First Thesis″ on Feuerbach

《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》第一条的基本论域是认识论,而非本体论。对象与客体、感性与所与是知识论中知觉问题的两对核心范畴。旧唯物主义的间接实在论将心灵理解为外物之镜,其逻辑后果是静观的态度、不可知论或唯心主义;唯心主义将外物理解为心灵之镜,作为自我意识的心灵被看作一台自己证明自己的自动机器。马克思在《提纲》第一条中克服了两者的不足,初步表达了实践建构论的知觉观。把《提纲》第一条解释为"超越‘唯物—唯心’之争的纲领"是一种误读。"超越论"的谜底是实践本体论,而实践本体论的谜底是本体论幻想。《提纲》第一条应被理解为新唯物主义解答认识论中的知觉问题之总纲。

Being the focus of discussion in academia, Karl Marx＇s “First Thesis” on Feuerbacn nas been interpreted in various ways and translated into different versions. Most Chinese scholars think that in the “First Thesis” Marx illustrated the fundamental difference between “new materialism” and old philosophy. However, some scholars have recently put forward entirely different interpretations, one of which sees the “First Thesis” as “transcending the division between materialism and idealism.” This new theory seems plausible, but it is indeed a misinterpretation of the “First Thesis” Firstly, the problem domain of Marx＇s “First Thesis” is not otology, but epistemology, which can be supported by both indirect and direct evidence. On the one hand, many philosophers and theorists, such as Ernst Bloch-- German philosopher, W. A. Suchting-- Australia Marxist, and Viktor Chernov- Russian SR Party theorist, have clearly pointed out that what Marx discussed in the “First Thesis” was epistemology. President Xi Jinping also pointed out that Marx dealt with the “active theory of reflection” of dialectical materialism. On the other hand, the core concepts and the basic idea of the “First Thesis” demonstrate that Marx answered questions related to epistemology in general, and perception in epistemology in particular. Secondly, in Marx＇s ＂First Thesis＂ there are two pairs of core concepts, namely ＂objectivity （Gegenstand）＂ versus ＂object （Objekt）,＂ and＂ sensibility （Sinnlichkeit）＂ versus ＂ the Given （Anschauung）.＂ ＂Actuality （Wirklichkeit）＂ is the equivalent of ＂objectivity （Gegenstand）＂ and ＂sensibility （Sinnliehkeit）,＂ and these three concepts were used as synonyms by classical German philosophers to refer to the ＂external world.＂ ＂Objekt＂ and ＂Anschauung＂ can be interpreted as ＂sense data＂ and ＂the Given＂ respectively, two common terms in contemporary philosophy. In addition, the reason that ＂objectivity, actuality, sensibility＂ were understood only in the literal sense of ＂the sense data or the Given＂ by all materialists before the age of Marx was that their theories of perception were one kind of indirect realism. Indirect realists claim that we perceive the external world in an indirect way by directly perceiving the corresponding sense data or the Given. From their perspective, the mind is like a mirror which can reflect the external world, and we directly perceive the ＂image＂ in the mirror, through which we indirectly know the ＂o^riginal thing. ＂ This theory of perception may result in skepticism, idealism or the contemplative attitude. In contrast to materialists, idealists view the external world as the mirror of the mind, and the external things or phenomena as the products constructed by the mind, hence the abstract ＂active side＂ of the theory. Finally, Marx developed the initial idea of the ＂ theory of perception as practical constructivism＂ by overcoming the defects of old materialism and idealism. Not only are perceiver, object, and sense organ all the products of sensuous activity, but the activity of perception itself is also a kind of sensuous practice. So we can conclude that the advocates of the ＂theory of transcending＂ have entirely misunderstood the problem domain and main idea of Marx＇s ＂First Thesis. ＂ In fact, the root of the ＂theory of transcending＂ lies in their ＂practice ontology,＂and the genuine origin of this ontology can be found in their imagination.