创新项目股权众筹中协调失败的影响因素研究

创新项目的成长通常依赖于多个投资人的一致投入所带来的网络外部性,但股权众筹的个人投资者之间可能会出现协调失败,导致创新项目失败。利用全局博弈模型和数值仿真,分析了项目运行阶段,投资人获取项目基本面的不完全私人信息后的决策及其均衡。研究发现:投资人偏见和投资人风险规避对协调成功有负面影响,项目基本面先验期望的公共信息对协调成功有正面影响,运行阶段私人信息的完全披露并不能消除协调失败。最后,在研究结论的支持下,从启动阶段加强投资人的一致性、设置投资人门槛和运行阶段选择信息披露精度这三个方面给出减少创新项目股权众筹中协调失败的政策建议。

The growth of innovative project financed by equity-based crowding usually depends on the network externality of invest- ments. Individual investors may face coordination failure, which leads to the failure of project. Global game model and com- puter simuation are adopted to analyze the strategy and equilibrium of multiply investors. Research conclusions are followed. Public information of expect payoff has positive influence on successful cooperation. Bias differences and risk aversion of in- vestors have negative influence on successful cooperation. Offering complete information to the private doesn＇t diminish coor- dination failure. Improving transparency of private information doesn＇t always reduce coordination failure. Finally, the policy suggestions of reducing probability of coordination failure in crowdfunding are offered, which include strengthening the con- sistency of investors, setting the threshold of investors and choosing the accuracy of information disclosure.