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努力水平下军工企业主导的供应链收益共享机制协调模型

Revenue-sharing mechanism coordination model of military enterprises-led supply chain under effort level
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摘要 为提高军事供应链的运作效率和成员间的协作水平,采取了一种基于博弈论和收益共享机制的协调方法。首先,分析了由一个军工企业、多个物资供应部门和多个军方用户构成的军事供应链模型,得出若物资供应部门独自承担投入努力成本而获得部分努力收益时,供应部门的最优努力水平将小于整个供应链的最优努力水平,收益共享协调机制失效的结论;然后,设计了由军工企业和供应部门共同承担供应部门努力成本的组合型收益共享协调机制;最后,用算例进行了验证。结果表明:该机制可有效地激励供应部门提高努力水平和积极性,促使供应链重新实现协调。 In order to improve the military supply chain operation and cooperation,a coordination method based on the game theory and revenue sharing mechanism is adopted.Firstly,a military supply chain model composed of a military enterprise,multiple material supplies departments and multiple military users is analyzed.The revenue sharing coordination mechanism is invalid if the supplies department alone bears the input effort cost and gets part effort revenue,and at the same time the supplies department optimal effort level is less than the whole supply chain optimal effort level.Then,a combined revenue sharing mechanism composed of the military enterprises and the supply department undertaking the supply department effort cost together is designed.Finally,a numerical example is used to verify the results.The results show that the mechanism can effectively motivate the supply department to improve the effort level and enthusiasm,and promote the supply chain to achieve coordination again.
作者 李建民
出处 《海军工程大学学报》 CAS 北大核心 2017年第4期79-85,共7页 Journal of Naval University of Engineering
基金 海军工程大学社会科学基金资助项目(HGDSK2015E41)
关键词 信息不对称 军事供应链 收益共享 协调 机制 information asymmetry military supply chain revenue-sharing coordination mechanism
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