股权制衡、管理者过度自信与过度投资行为

Equity Balance,Managerial Over-confidence and Over-investment Behavior

从行为金融学的视角,探讨管理者过度自信与过度投资之间的关系,并分组比较不同现金流水平下以及不同股权制衡度及制衡股东性质下对二者关系的影响。研究表明:过度自信管理者更倾向于过度投资并在现金流充裕时其程度加重;股权制衡对管理者过度自信带来的过度投资有一定的治理效应,相对于股权制衡度较低的企业,较高的股权制衡其效果相对较好,同时相对于国有股东,非国有股东的制衡效果相对较好。

From the perspective of behavioral finance, this article analyzes the relationship between managerial over-confidence and o- ver-investment, and studies the impact of the different level of cash flow, the different equity balance and the nature of balanced share- holders on the relationship. Research shows that： Overconfident managers tend to be over-investment, and such case becomes more serious with abundant cash flow; Equity balance has certain governance effect on managerial over-confidence of investment distortions, and compared with low degree of equity balance, the effect of the higher equity balance is relatively good. At the same time, compared with the state-owned shareholders, non-state-owned shareholders have better balance effect .