摘要
很多零售商常处于其所在供应链的主导地位,针对零售商具有价格领导权并且考虑专利保护的闭环供应链进行分析,运用博弈理论得到了零售商、原制造商和再制造商的最优策略,以及最优策略关于再制造成本节约的变化规律。研究表明:随着再制造成本节约的增加,最优单位专利许可费和废旧产品回收价格逐步增加,最优产品批发价格和销售价格逐步降低,并通过数值算例表明:零售商、再制造商和供应链系统的利润逐步增加,原制造商的利润逐步减少。
Many retailers are usually in the leading position of the supply chain. We study the closed-loop supply chain with patent protection in which the retailer has the price leadership, and obtain the optimal strategies of the retailer, the original manufacturer and the re-manufacturer using game theory, and the changing law of the opti- mal strategies with respect to the remanufacturing cost savings. The study indicates that as the remanufacturing cost savings increases, the optimal unit patent licensing fee and collection price of used products increase gradu- ally, and the optimal wholesale and sale price decrease gradually. Furthermore, we find the profit of the retailer, the re-manufacturer and the supply chain system all increase gradually, and the profit of the originally decreases gradually from the numerical example.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第8期109-114,共6页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71301126
71472143)
湖北省高校人文社会科学重点研究基地-企业决策支持研究中心资助项目(DSS20150211)
国家留学基金资助项目(201308420381)
湖北省教育厅人文社会科学研究资助项目(15Y071
15Q071)
关键词
闭环供应链
零售商价格领导权
专利许可
定价策略
closed-loop supply chain
retailer price leadership
patent licensing
pricing strategy