股权激励、代理冲突与股价崩盘风险——基于中国资本市场的经验证据

Equity Incentives,Agency Conflict and Stock Price Crash Risk:Empirical Evidence Based on Chinese Capital Market

使用2007—2015年我国A股上市公司的数据,从管理者和大股东的行为动机角度出发,考察高管股权激励与股价崩盘风险之间的关系。研究发现,我国上市公司股权激励水平与股价崩盘风险之间呈显著的正相关关系;随着公司成长性和大股东控制权的提高,上述正相关关系会减小;牛市阶段股权激励水平与股价崩盘风险之间的正相关关系显著高于熊市阶段。基于此,从公司角度上看,上市公司不应忽视股权激励对股价崩盘风险的负面效应;从监管层角度上看,在鼓励上市公司股权激励发展的同时,应重点规范和完善相关制度环境。

Using a sample of A-share listed firms in China for the period of 2007—2015,this paper investigates the relationship between executive equity-based incentives and stock price crash risk from the perspective of managers and large shareholders’behavior motivations.Our results showthat,the equity incentives level is positively associated with stock price crash risk,and this relationship decreases with the improvement of corporate growth and the control rights of large shareholders.The conclusion still holds after controlling the endogeneity problem.Further analyses reveal that the positive relationship between equity incentives level and stock price crash risk is more pronounced in the bull market.This study not only deepens the understanding of the economic consequences of equity incentives and the influence factors of stock price crash risk,but also provides more detailed empirical evidences for managerial entrenchment tendency and large shareholder governance effect.Meanwhile,this paper also has important implications for howregulators regulating the development of equity incentives,protecting the interests of investors and maintaining the stability of capital market.