策略乘客行为下航空供应链竞争协调研究

Airline Supply Chain Competitive Coordination with Strategic Passenger Behavior

在已有的航空公司销售供应链研究中,中介代理商只是一个普通的跟随者,甚至有被直销取代的趋势。本文在供大于求且面临策略乘客的竞争市场环境下,研究了由中介主导并决定收益分享比例的双航班竞争销售供应链模式。通过建立双航班竞争的博弈模型,求解出航空公司和中介的收益及其分享比例,并分析了该供应链的有效性。研究结果表明:在乘客购买偏好较小时,该模式对航空公司有利。从收益的视角看,该模式存在的情况下优于直销模式。

The intermediary agent, which is replaced by possible direct selling, is only assumed to be a follower in the airline supply chain in previous literature. A study is conducted into the competitive supply chain model of two flights in which the revenue sharing proportion is decided by the intermediary agent in the oversupplied competitive market environment with strategic passengers. A competitive game model of two flights is introduced. The revenue of the airline and intermediary agent and the revenue sharing proportion are obtained. The effectiveness of this supply chain is analyzed.Finally, it is found that this model is favorable for airlines when the passenger′s buying preferences are small. This model is found superior to the direct selling model from the perspective of revenue.