摘要
投资决策在我国上市公司的财务决策中发挥着重要的作用,主导着公司价值的创造,而现实企业中过度投资和投资不足等现象一直影响着企业的发展。在我国,上市公司大多数由大股东控制,而如何发挥大股东的监督作用及抑制非效率投资行为已成为近年来学术界关注的焦点话题。在国有上市公司中,由于大股东的"缺位",其代理人为了控制风险和自身的业绩,更多的表现出投资不足。然而许多企业由于两权分离造成的代理问题、信息不对称等因素存在关联投资、恶性担保、盲目多元化等过度投资现象。本文通过分析其中存在的财务风险、经营风险和危害,进而分析其产生的原因,最后提出相应建议。
Play an important role in the investment decision of China's Listed Companies in the financial decisionmaking, leading the creation of company value, and excessive investment and insufficient investment phenomenon in real enterprises has been affecting the development of enterprises. In China, the majority of listed companies are controlled by large shareholders, and how to play the supervisory role of large shareholders and curb inefficient investment behavior has become the focus of academic attention in recent years. In the state-owned listed companies, due to the absence of large shareholders, their agents show more investment in order to control risks and their own performance. However, many enterprises, such as agency problems and asymmetric information caused by the separation of the two rights, have excessive investment such as related investment, vicious guarantee and blind diversifi cation. This paper analyzes the existing fi nancial risks, business risks and hazards, and then analyzes the causes, and fi nally puts forward corresponding suggestions.
出处
《吉林金融研究》
2017年第8期14-17,共4页
Journal of Jilin Financial Research
关键词
非效率投资
过度投资
投资不足
Ineffi cient Investment
Over Investment
Insuffi cient Investment