摘要
文中建立制造商为领导者,零售商为跟随者的Stackelberg博弈模型。分别设置无政府补贴,政府将补贴给予制造商、零售商以及消费者等四种情景,分别研究相应情景下制造商与零售商对于新产品与再制品的最优定价;对比分析不同情景下的主体定价策略;旨在厘清政府对于不同主体的补贴对新产品与再制品定价策略的影响机理。
Stackelberg game model with manufacturer as the leader and retailer as the follower has been established. The author sets four scenes that there is no government subsidy,subsidy given to manufacturer,retailer and consumer. The author studied the optimal pricing strategy of manufacturer or retailer,and compared different pricing strategy in deferent scene.It aimed to clarify the influence mechanism of government's subsidy on the new product and the remanufacturing pricing strategy.
出处
《物流工程与管理》
2017年第8期148-149,共2页
Logistics Engineering and Management
关键词
供应链
再制品
政府补贴
定价策略
supply chain
remanufactured product
government subsidy
pricing strategy