环境行政执法中的博弈决策分析——基于执法效能的视角

Analysis on the Game Theory Decision in Eco-protection Enforcement from the Perspective of Administrative Law Enforcement Effectiveness

借助博弈论基本模型,针对环境行政执法中"激励的悖论"现象及非线性效应,依据混合策略纳什均衡博弈矩阵,能够分析环境行政执法中囚徒困境的发生机制,并提出改进环境行政监管执法中的动态博弈与治理策略。导致环境执法效能不足的原因,在于博弈各方行为抉择时的信息不对称与信息不充分,改进措施在于改变执法博弈中收益结构的激励侧重点,即强化对环境行政执法机构的监管,改进环境治理效果的立法机制和改进执法方式的切入点,提升对环境执法行为的日常监管效力,并在环保立法过程中强化这种结构性约束。

With the help of basic model of game theory, aimed at the phenomenon of 'paradox of motivation' and the nonlinear effect of environmental administrative law enforcement,and based on the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium game matrix, analyzed the occurrence mechanism of prisoners' dilemma in environmental administrative law enforcement, this paper concerns the improvement of the dynamic game and governance strategy of environmental administrative supervision and enforcement.The reason for the insufficient efficiency of environmental law enforcement lies in the information asymmetry and insufficient information in the decision-making of the game.The improvement measures are to change the incentives of the revenue structure in law enforcement game, that is to strengthen the supervision of environmental administrative law enforcementagencies, improve the legislative mechanism of environmental governance and improve the approach of law enforcement, at the same time the daily supervision of environmental law enforcement is enhanced and the structural constraint in the process of environmental legislation is strengthened.