公共选择理论下的税收成本与社会契约形式转变

Tax Cost and Transformation of Social Contract in Public Choice Theory

本文从布坎南和福特所构建的"间接税分析模型"中分析出了不同的税收规则给纳税人带来的不同的时间扭曲,并将这种时间扭曲理解为税收成本。征税者也存在根据完税时间来调整预期支出结构的行为,这样一种税收成本概念同样适用于征税者。由此,在构建了一个社会契约一般原则之后,本文尝试从税收成本的角度对社会契约形式转变予以分析。认为只有在纳税人和征税者之间对完税的时间具有预期一致性时,也就是双方税收成本相等,社会契约得以稳定存在。如果纳税人由于税收规则带来的扭曲从而使其对社会契约的认知发生改变,纳税人将移动税收成本曲线,从而使得社会契约形式从"霍布斯契约"向"洛克契约"发生转变。

This paper analyzes the time distortion caused by different tax rules to taxpayers from the 'analysis model of indirect tax'constructed by Buchanan and Ford,and explains this time distortion as the tax cost. If the tax levier also has the incentives to adjust the expected expenditure structure based on the duty time,then the concept of tax cost also applies to the levier. After constructing a general principle of social contract,this paper attempts to analyze the transformation of the social contract from the perspective of the tax cost. When the taxpayers and leviers have the expected consistency regarding the time of tax payment,namely,when the tax costs on both sides are equal,the social contract can be stabilized. The social contract will be changed due to the distortion caused by the tax rules to the taxpayer,and the taxpayer will move the tax cost curve,which will change the social contract from the Hobbes contract to the Locke contract.