摘要
胡塞尔反心理主义逻辑观的溃退具有必然性,一是由于其理论自身存在困难,例如他一方面试图摆脱主观唯心主义的束缚,另一方面却不自觉地以主观唯心主义的态度宣扬客观唯心主义理念论;他孤立地认识并且严格地划分了本质领域与经验领域、理念领域与事实领域以及绝对性与相对性等概念;他对怀疑主义的态度也有待商榷。二是由现代逻辑的发展需求所决定。随着哥德尔的不完全性定理、维特根斯坦的语言游戏说和乔姆斯基的心理主义语言学的出现,人工语言和形式系统的局限性日益显露,重返自然语言成为逻辑学的必然趋势。
The rout of E. Husserl' s anti-psychologism is inevitable. First, there are some questions in his theory. For instance, on the one hand, he tried to throw off the chains of subjective idealism on the other hand, he had the attitude without consciously. He made a strict differentiation between essence and experience be- tween conception and fact, between absoluteness and relativity, and so on. These standpoints are unreason- able. His attitude to skepticism is open to question. Secondly, by the needs for the development of modern log- ic. With the advent of K. Godel' s incompleteness theorem, L. Wittgenstein' s theory of language game and N. Chomsky' s psychologism linguistics, the faults of artificial language and formal system were exposed gradually and return to natural language was becoming the inevitable trend of logic development.
作者
李琦
LI Qi(College of Nationality Culture and Cognitive Science, Guizhou Minzu University, Guiyang, Guizhou550025, Chin)
出处
《贵州工程应用技术学院学报》
2017年第4期78-83,共6页
Journal of Guizhou University Of Engineering Science
基金
贵州民族大学2016年度教师科研基金项目"胡塞尔的反心理主义逻辑观研究"
项目编号:16jsxm046