民营银行准入监管的演化博弈分析

Analysis of the Supervision of Private Banking Entry Based on Evolutionary Game

放开银行牌照,对希望纵深参与综合性金融业务的民营企业有着划时代意义,然而当监管权力下放地方监管部门时,民营企业为抢占银行牌照很可能会选择向地方监管部门寻租取得银行牌照。该文引入寻租理论,以中央监管部门监管为约束条件,构建民营企业与地方监管部门间的演化博弈模型,运用数值仿真得到民营企业和地方监管部门博弈行为的演化规律和不同条件下的稳定策略,分析民营企业与地方监管部门策略选择的影响因素。研究结果表明:在中央监管部门的不同监管力度下,申办者和地方监管部门的初始状态影响演化稳定策略,增加寻租成本可以有效阻止寻租行为。由此提出减少或杜绝寻租行为的政策建议是加强监管制度建设、加大惩罚力度以及鼓励公信力组织加入监管等。

The banking license plays a key role in developing comprehensive financial business for private enterprises. The theory of rent-seeking is introduced and an evolutionary game model between private enterprises and regional regulators is constructed based on the supervision of the central regulator. The evolutionary law between private enterprises and regional regulators and stable strategies under different conditions are deduced by numerical simulation. The influencing factors to select the better strategies for the private enterprises and regional regulators are analyzed. The results show that the initial states of the applicant and the regional regulatory affect the evolutionarily stable strategies under the different strength of the central regulator and the rent-seeking behavior can be effectively prevented by increasing the rent-seeking cost. On the basis, some policy suggestions to reduce or eliminate rent-seeking behavior are put forward, such as strengthening the construction of the supervision system, increasing penalties for rent-seeking and encouraging the credibility organizations to join in the regulation.