浅析我国大学助学金的执行体系——基于委托代理关系理论

Research on the Implementation System of College Scholarship in China Based on Principal——Agent Relationship Theory

我国在高等教育阶段建立了以国家奖助学金、国家助学贷款为主的多元国家资助政策体系,从制度上保障了家庭经济困难学生顺利就学。以大学生国家助学金为例,在其执行体系内部,中央政府、地方政府、高校与学生等主体之间存在错综复杂的委托代理关系,其中信息不对称与不确定性根深蒂固,由此出现了逆向选择或道德风险问题,最终导致政府及高校公信力、产出率、和谐度等指标不断下降。因此,相关主体亟待通过精简委托代理关系、建立舆情监管、推行精准资助、倡导思政教育等措施治理委托代理的流弊,从而确保我国高等教育资助事业的良性发展。

In the stage of higher education, China have established a diversified subsidy policy system with national scholar-ships and state student loans, which systematically guarantee the smooth attendance of students with financial difficulties. There are intricate principal-agent relations between the central government, the local government, the college and the students, among which the information asymmetry and the uncertainty are deep-rooted, and the reverse selection or moral hazard problems will have to happen, and ultimately result in government and university credibility, output rate, harmony and other indicators continue to decline. Therefore,the relevant subjects need to ensure the healthy development of the higher education subsidy in China through streamlin-ing the principal-agent relationship, establishing public opinion supervision, implementing precision fund-raising and advocating ideological and political education.