英国脱欧的政治经济学逻辑——基于国际公共品供给的双层博弈分析

The Political Economic logic of the Brexit-On the Basis of the Two-level Game of Public Goods Supply

欧盟及在其基础上形成的欧洲一体化收益具有国际公共品的性质。而国际公共品的供给是多个民族国家集体决策与单个国家内部利益集团交织作用的结果,是国内国际双重博弈的产物。随着"逆全球化"的兴起,这种双重博弈现象愈发明显。为此,本文首先构建了一个对国际公共品供给中双层博弈进行分析的理论框架,然后以此为基础,剖析英国脱欧背后蕴含的政治经济学逻辑。研究结果表明,欧盟及在其基础上形成的一体化收益的分配是不均匀的,即表现出明显的非中性特征,以致在英国国内选民中形成了两大利益集团——从一体化收益中获益较多的精英集团及获益较少、甚至为负的中低收入集团,各利益集团彼此博弈,以谋求自身利益的最大化。而在国际层面,英国从欧洲一体化中所获收益与成本付出的不相匹配,导致其与欧盟之间讨价还价,以提升英国的国家利益。在公投所体现的直接民主制度下,中低收入集团的利益最终决定了国家利益,于是脱离欧盟即不继续参与欧盟这一国际公共品的供给遂成为英国的最终选择。

The EU and its integration gains have the nature as international public goods. The supply of international public goods is the result of decision-making between nations and interest groups of individual countries. It is the outcome of the game between domestic and international levels. With the rise of ＂anti-globalization＂, this two-level game becomes more and more obvious. This paper first constructs a framework of the two-level game analysis of international public goods supply, and then take advantage of it to analyze the logic of the political economic logic of the Brexit. The distribution of benefit from the EU＇s integration is non-neutrality, which leads to the formation of two major interest groups elite group and low - income group. At the international level, the mismatch of the cost and the benefit from integration led to the UK to bargain to enhance national interests. The interests of low-income groups ultimately determine the national interests under the direct democratic system. Therefore, getting out of the EU becomes the final choice for the UK.