会计稳健性、高管CEO权力与债务成本关系研究

A Study on the Relationship between Accounting Conservatism,Executives' CEO Power and Debt Costs

文章结合上市公司的数据,用多元回归和层次回归法验证了会计稳健性与债务成本的关系,以及高管CEO权力对二者的调节作用。研究结果表明:会计稳健性与债务成本负相关,当公司具有较高的会计稳健性,债权人要求的风险补偿越小;以结构权力、专家权力、所有权权力和声誉权力四个维度八个变量的综合指标衡量的高管CEO权力对会计稳健性与债务成本关系具有调节作用,显著增强了二者的关系,即CEO权力越大,会计稳健性对债务成本的影响越明显。有利于从高管CEO的视角,提高会计稳健性水平,降低企业的债务成本。

This paper, combined with the data of listed companies, applies multiple regression and hierarchical regression methods to veri- fy the relationship between accounting conservatism and debt costs, as well as the moderating effect of executives＇ CEO power on it. The study results show that： Accounting conservatism and debt costs are negatively related, and the accounting conservatism is stronger, the risk compensation required by the creditors is smaller; The executives＂ CEO power, which is measured by the comprehensive index of structure power, expert power, ownership power and reputation power in four dimensions with eight variables has a moderating effect on the relationship between accounting conservatism and debt costs, and significantly strengthens the relationship between the two. Namely the greater the CEO power is, the more obvious influence of accounting conservatism on debt costs would be. The paper, from the perspec- tive of executives＇ CEO, suggests improving the level of accounting conservatism and reducing corporate debt costs.