采购管理中拍卖与协商两阶段机制研究进展

Theory and Progress of Procurement Auction-Negotiation Problem

采购拍卖协商机制因不仅能保留采购拍卖在价格发现方面的优势,而且能弥补其在供应商关系管理方面的不利影响而开始受到关注。这种新的采购拍卖方式不同于传统拍卖手段,可以通过两阶段信息甄别过程揭示买卖双方的私有信息,平衡合同成本与合同效率之间的问题。在采购拍卖过程中,采购商作为买方来确定谁是最终的获胜者,而供应商作为卖方需决策如何进行投标。因此,笔者以投标包含的因素为研究主线,从买卖双方关注的价格因素扩展到质量、服务等更多因素;以买方确定获胜者的过程为研究辅线,从拍卖决策推进到拍卖协商决策。基于主线与辅线的交叉结合,对单一价格采购拍卖、单一价格采购拍卖协商、多属性采购拍卖、多属性采购拍卖协商领域进行了文献总结。而后,对多属性采购拍卖问题,笔者则从研究视角或方法重新梳理现有文献。分别对这三个领域研究成果:单边私有信息到双边私有信息的研究、博弈论方法到实验方法的研究、确定性需求到不确定性需求的研究进行了梳理,对文献的研究思路、结论及相互关联性进行了回顾和评述。这三方面的总结不仅体现了采购拍卖问题的研究热点,而且展示了其他学科在拍卖问题研究中的交叉融合。最后从供应商库存风险、不确定性需求、不完备合约等研究视角给出了未来的研究方向。

The procurement auction negotiation mechanism has gained more attention. The reason derives from not only the advantage of procurement auction in price discovery, but also the positive impact on suppliers＇ relationship management. This new approach for procurement problem can reveal private information from buyers and sellers and achieve balance between cost and efficiency of contract. For procurement auction problem, a procurer as a buyer must decide who is winner and a supplier as a seller must decide how to make bids. Thus, the literature is summarized based on the following two aspects. The first line is about the influence factors from price, quality and service to the other ones. The second line is the decision process between the sellers and buyers from auction to auction-negotiation. Four problems are presented, i.e.single-price procurement auction problem, single-price procurement auction negotiation problem, multi-attribute procurement auction problem and multi-attribute procurement auction negotiation. At the same time,different ideas are provided to make a literal review, e.g. price attribute to multiple attribute, unilateral private information to bilateral private information, game theory to experimental methods and fixed demand to uncertain demand. At the end of the paper, the prospect of research in this new field is given based on suppliers＇ risk, uncertain demand and imperfect contract.