个人碳交易机制下的消费者报价策略与减排效果

The Consumer's Quotation Strategies and the Effect of Emission Reduction under the Personal Carbon Trading Scheme

碳价、交易成本及减排效果问题是个人碳交易研究的核心。在现实中,碳交易市场上存在信息不对称,导致无效率的讨价还价;相比企业碳交易,个人碳交易的交易成本更高,进而影响消费者报价策略。本文构建了信息不对称情境下的报价博弈模型,研究了交易成本对消费者报价策略的影响。同时通过数值模拟法对比了个人碳交易与阶梯电价在减排效果上的差异。研究发现适中的排放权初始碳配额量是消费者报价博弈行为开展的基础;博弈模型存在两个纳什均衡点,交易成本对买卖方双方的报价策略影响不同;个人碳交易机制的节能减排效果更优。据此,本文提出了相应的政策建议,期望为中国未来个人碳交易制度的实施提供理论参考。

Allowance price,transaction costs and the effect of emission reduction are the focus of Personal Carbon Trading（PCT）research.In reality,there must exist information asymmetry situation that may lead to inefficient bargaining;and compared with enterprise carbon trading,the transaction cost is higher which will also affect quotation strategies.Thus,this paper models a game with incomplete information to explore the quotation strategies of consumers and researches the influence of transaction cost on the quotation strategies.Furthermore,numerical simulation will be used to compare the difference effect of emission reduction between PCT and Increasing Block Electricity Tariffs（IBTs）.The results indicate that the equilibrium price can be achieved under certain conditions,which is the foundation of the quotation strategies;there are two Nash equilibria in the game,and the transaction cost of PCT scheme has a different influence on the quotation strategies;the effect of emission reduction under PCT is better than IBTs.On the basis of the results,the policy implications of this study are discussed so as to provide theory reference for the future implications in China.