江山靠谁守 才不付东流？--控股家族非经济目标与经营权释出倾向实证研究

Who will be the Next CEO:Research on the Relationship between the Non-economic Goals and the Tendency of Offering Management Rights to Professional Managers

让子女接班还是将经营权释出给职业经理人,是代际传承时代背景下企业主的重要战略决策。文章基于委托代理理论,展示了家族/非家族高管在实现家族的非经济/经济目标上的各自优势,从控股家族非经济目标解释了企业CEO聘任决策,解构了能力与情感冲突的选择困境。根据全国工商联"中国非公有制经济健康状况评价"抽样调查数据发现,在家族成员与职业经理人都可兹聘任的情况下,那些更看重非经济目标的家族越不倾向于聘请职业经理人担任CEO作为企业下一代领导人。一代企业家的决策权力缺乏有效制衡将会强化非经济目标重要性与经营权释出之间的负效应;企业主与各级官员的频繁互动,加深社会联系巩固家族产权,有助于降低职业经理人的代理成本,显著地弱化非经济目标与经营权释出的负效用。文章的意义在于从控股家族所追求的目标解释为什么有的企业宁愿忍受企业绩效下降的经济后果仍然要雇佣家族成员担任CEO这个看似"非理性"现象。

It is an important strategic decision in the current era to hire CEO from family successors or professional managers for the first - generation entrepreneurs to handle over the management rights. Based on the agency theory, this paper discusses the tradeoff between the emotion and capability with the economic and non - economic goals and explains the relationship between the goals of controlling family and the decision of hiring a CEO based on the advantage of the family managers to obtain the non -economic goals, while the advantage of the nonfamily managers to obtain the economic goals. The results, based on questionnaires from ACFIC data, reveal that the family who has more important noneconomic goals is not prone to hire the professional managers as the next CEO when these two types of candidates are available. The power of making decision of the first generation strengthens the negative relations while the political connections weaken the negative relations. This research contends to explain the seemly irrational hiring activities that some firms tender to hire the family CEOs even though the CEOs underperformance.