基于博弈论的农村小额信贷信用风险控制研究

Research on Credit Risk Control of Rural Microfinance Based on Game Theory

农村小额信贷是一种解决农村金融资金供给不足和城乡结构二元化问题的有效途径,但信用风险却成为其可持续发展的主要障碍。本文通过建立农村贷款人和小额信贷机构之间的动态博弈模型,基于分析结果得出:征信制度不完善、信用评级体系不完备、信用环境较差、法律法规不规范是我国农村小额信贷信用风险逐渐加剧的根本原因,在博弈分析的基础上针对性地提出风险控制的建议。

Rural microfinance is an effective way to solve the problem of insufficient supply of rural financial funds and the duality of urban and rural structure, but credit risk has become a major obstacle to its sustainable development. Through the establishment of the dynamic game model between the rural lender and the microfinance institution, the analysis results show that the credit information system is not perfect, the credit rating system is not complete, the credit environment is poor, the laws and regulations are not standardized in China＇ s rural microcredit credit risk Gradually increase the root cause. And countermeasures are proposed upon the game theory analysis of the risk control.