作为“意义”之产物的实在对象:实在对象的现象学构造(英文)

Actual Objects as Productions of Meaning： How Are Actual Objects Constituted Phenomenologically

本文试图论证，外部对象乃是被一种特殊的现象学“意义”所构建的。根据胡塞尔的理论，对象的基本构成方式乃是“意义投射”，而此行为又有一个层级结构。在此层级结构的最底层乃是一个单纯客体化的表象行为，此行为并不设定对象的存在，亦即，无论是实在的还是虚幻的对象都首先需要被作为一“纯然物”而被客体化。而设定一对象之存在的行为则是一个建基于表象行为之上的意识行为层次，只有在这个层面上，作为特殊意义的“真”或“假”才参与到对对象的构建之中。

This article is to describe the structure within which an actual object is constituted phenomenologically by introducing Husserl＇s analysis on the constitutional intentionality as a sense-bestowing. This process has a hierarchical structure. I will argue that the most fundamental stratum of this structure is a mere presentation of a ＂mere object＂ or ＂mere thing ＂, which is not necessarily an actual external thing. Based on it there is the level of presentation act of posits-taking as a higher noetic level, in which a sense of being actual or being illusionary can be given.