面向存款保险制度的道德风险管理研究

A Study of Moral Hazard Management With Deposit Insurance System

存款保险制度下的道德风险问题是指存款保险制度设计的不合理,使得相关的利益方包括存款人、存款保险机构以及投保银行都有可能从自身利益最大化的角度出发,在相互的博弈中损害其他主体甚至社会公共利益。本文首先通过研究分析,阐述了存款保险的作用机制,指出了存款保险制度有效性的前提条件。基于此,说明了这些制度要素设计不合理情况下所带来的道德风险问题。紧接着,分别从存款人、参保银行以及存款保险机构角度对存款保险制度下道德风险问题及其诱因进行了深入的分析。最后,针对存款保险制度下道德风险问题产生的原因,分别从投保方式、风险差别费率、限额存款保险以及监管协调机制这几个方面对道德风险约束条款提出了意见和建议。

This article describes, based on the enactment of the Deposit Insurance Ordinance of China on May 1, 2015, Firstly, the mechanism of deposit insurance implementation to suggest the pre-conditions of effective deposit insurance system before studying the mechanism of deposit insurance, moral hazard problem under improperly- designed system to propose the reasons for moral hazard from depositors and to insure banks and deposit insurance institution with the suggestions and opinions being proposed to prevent moral hazards in the deposit insurance system including from the insurance method, Risk Based Premium, limited deposit insurance and regulatory coordination mechanism, etc.