摘要
国家实力对比的变化会引起崛起国对现存国际制度分配结果的不满。崛起国大体上可以采取两项策略来改革国际制度安排:一是推动现存国际制度内部的改革,二是在外部创建功能重叠的新的国际制度。已有的制度主义研究多认为新建国际制度很难实现,但现实世界中却出现了崛起国成功创建国际制度的不少实例。作者试图探寻在何种条件下,崛起国创建的国际制度更容易获得初始生存。由于新建国际组织天生的脆弱性,崛起国能否建立稳定可见的自我约束机制,塑造"新旧"国际制度的合作预期,是决定国际制度能否创建成功的关键。基于此,作者提出一个制度间合作的分析框架,认为崛起国在议题领域选择和组织间架构两方面的策略选择,会影响制度间合作承诺的可信性,进而影响新创国际制度的初始生存。通过对亚洲开发银行、亚洲货币基金、清迈倡议以及金砖银行创建的比较案例研究,文中提出的假说得到验证。其政策启示在于,崛起国通过选择网络外部性较低的议题领域以及建立合股、授权和战略伙伴等制度化的组织间架构,有利于塑造制度合作的稳定预期,促进国际制度在创设初期的生存。
The shift of the balance between powers raises the rising powers' dissatisfaction towards the distributing effect of current international institutions.Rising powers generally take two strategies to reform existing international institutions:one is to promote the reform within international institutions,and the other is to create new institutions which overlap with existing ones.Although institutionalist studies have previously argued that it has been difficult to create new institutions,successful cases still exist.This paper inquires under which condition new international institutions created by rising powers would more easily survive at the initial stage.Due to the inherent vulnerability of newly established international organizations,I argue that the successful installation of new institutions relies on the rising powers' ability to set up stable and selfrestraint mechanisms,and the ability to promote the prospects for cooperation between the 'new' and 'old' institutions.Therefore,I propose a framework of inter-institution cooperation.It indicates that the credibility of cooperation between institutions would be influenced by the strategic selection of issue areas and institutional arrangements of inter-organizational architecture,which further impacts the survival of newly established institutions.By comparing the creation of Asian Development Bank,the Asian Monetary Fund,the Chiang Mai Initiative and the New Development Bank,I demonstrate the proposed hypothesis.The policy implications of this study appear to be that the survival chance of new institutions created by rising powers could be promoted through selecting issue areas with low network externality as well as setting up inter-organizational architecture with high level of institutionalization,such as the mechanisms of joint stock,delegation and strategic partnerships,which all facilitate the prospects for cooperation.
出处
《世界经济与政治》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第9期84-106,共23页
World Economics and Politics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"亚投行与现有多边开发机构的竞争性与互补性研究"(批准号:16CGJ022)的阶段性成果
关键词
崛起国
国际制度
网络外部性
组织间架构
承诺的可信性
rising powers
international institutions
the network externality
inter-organizational architecture
the credibility of commitment