摘要
将博弈论引入节点行为的决断中,在网络中建立1个基于节点数据传输可靠度的重复博弈模型。针对节点的行为引入最优惩罚程度的惩罚机制,在保证对自私节点产生足够震慑的同时,又避免对自私节点过度惩罚而造成节点的提早死亡,从而提升网络数据传输的整体效益。研究结果表明:采取最优惩罚轮数的惩罚策略能够在保证最少的减小网络生命周期的前提下,最大程度地提升网络的整体效益约22.83%。
A repeated game model of the reliability of data transmission was proposed based on the hierarchical routing protocol. A punishment mechanism model in the game was introduced and the degree of punishment mechanism was demonstrated, which not only ensured the selfish node cooperation but also avoided the premature death of selfish nodes subjected to excessive punishment. The results show that the penalty strategy with the optimal penalty round can guarantee the minimum reduction of the network life cycle. The efficiency of the network can be improved by the penalty strategy with the optimal penalty round about 22.83%.
出处
《中南大学学报(自然科学版)》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第7期1762-1768,共7页
Journal of Central South University:Science and Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(61107040)
吉林大学研究生创新研究计划项目(2015111)~~
关键词
无线传感器网络
能量均衡
路由
重复博弈
理性偏好
wireless sensor network(WSN)
energy balance
routing
repeated game
rational preferences