基于演化博弈的赣江流域生态补偿研究

随着赣江流域生态环境的日益严峻,各利益方冲突加剧,因此不同区域了解他们的利益诉求和博弈策略,是进行高效生态补偿的关键。本文基于流域生态补偿的相关原则,确定了赣江流域生态补偿利益方,并根据"囚徒困境"博弈模型,分析了不同区域政府管理者之间、政府管理者与社区居民间生态补偿的选择过程。结果显示,在政府管理者之间的生态补偿博弈过程中,通过建立赔偿金制度,当赔偿金高于生态收益与保护成本的差值时,即政府管理者与社区居民间的生态补偿博弈是在赔偿金高于生态保护成本与内生收益的差值,就可以跳出"囚徒困境",实现流域生态补偿方选择生态补偿策略,受偿方选择环境保护策略,从而获得最佳的生态补偿效益。

When the ecological environment of the Ganjiang River Basin is becoming increasingly serious, understanding the interests and game strategy of all parties is the key to efficient ecological compensation. According to the relevant principles of ecological compensation in river basin, this paper specifies the Ganjiang River Basin ecological compensation stakeholders, and based on the ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂ game model, analyzes the selection process of ecological compensation between government managers, and the selection process of ecological compensation between government managers and community residents. The results show, in the process of ecological compensation between government managers, when the fine is higher than the difference between the ecological benefits and ecological protection cost （the ecological compensation game between community residents and the government, when the fine is higher than the difference between the ecological protection cost and the endogenous income）, the establishment of a fine system can resolve the ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂, and the ecological compensators can choose an ecological compensation strategy, and the ecological protectors can choose an environmental protection strategy as to get the best ecological compensation benefits.