监管模式、政治体制与矿难——基于跨国数据的证据

SUPERVISION MODE,POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND COALMINE ACCIDENTS:EVIDENCE FROM CROSS-COUNTRY DATA

煤矿安全生产问题不仅是中国面临的严峻问题,也是一个世界性的难题。本文首次利用1982-2014年九个产煤大国的跨国面板数据,从经济学的角度检验了煤矿监管模式和政治体制对矿难的影响。结果表明:(1)煤炭安全生产的集权监管有利于减少矿难死亡率。一个国家的煤矿安全监管模式由分权改成集权,可以减少近一半的死亡率。(2)一个国家的政治体制不会直接影响矿难的死亡率。这说明煤矿安全生产问题主要是一个监管体制问题,而不是一个政治体制问题。(3)在发展中国家,集权监管模式对降低矿难死亡率的效果更明显。(4)在转型国家,监管集权和改进政府问责都能降低矿难死亡率。本文的结果对于矿难的跨国比较分析以及遏制矿难具有重要的政策含义。

The problem of coalmine safety production is not only a serious problem faced by China, but also a worldwide problem. For the first time we use the 1982--2014 cross-country panel data of nine countries that they are rich in coal to investigate the impact of coalmine supervision mode and political in- stitutions on coalmine accidents. Empirical evidence shows as follows： First, centralized supervision of coalmine safety production is conductive to reducing mortality rate of coalmine accidents. Changing from decentralized supervision to centralized supervision can reduce nearly half of mortality rate. Second, politi- cal institutions do not directly affect the coaimine mortality rate, which shows that the problem of coalmine safety production relates to supervision institutions rather than political institutions. Third, in developing countries, the effect of centralized supervision to reduce the mortality rate is more significant. Fourth, in transitional countries, both centralized supervision and improvement of accountability can reduce the mortality rate. The conclusion of this paper has important policy implications on cross-countries comparative analysis of coalmine accidents and containing coalmine accidents.