董事异质性、产权性质与隧道效应

Director's Heterogeneity, Poverty Right and Tunneling Effect

本文以大股东通过占用上市公司资金损害小股东利益的第二类代理问题为研究对象。从董事异质性视角,考察控股股东董事、非控股股东董事、内部董事和独立董事对大股东隧道效应的影响。利用上市公司相关数据进行实证分析发现:与内部董事和控股股东董事在一定程度上对大股东隧道效应有促进作用相反,非控股股东董事和独立董事更能有效抑制隧道效应;而且,非控股股东董事比独立董事的抑制效果更强。还发现,在业绩差的企业和国有企业中,非控股股东董事对隧道效应抑制效果明显;独立董事在业绩差的企业中对隧道效应抑制明显,但对国有企业中隧道效应抑制不明显。

The subject of this thesis is the second category agency problem that major shareholders damaged the interest of minority shareholders by occupying the capital of listed companies. The authors discussed the effects of controlling shareholders, non- controlling shareholders, internal directors and individual directors on tunneling effect of major shareholders from the aspects of directors＇ heterogeneity. The authors analyzed relevant data of listed companies and proved that non-controlling internal directors and controlling directors to some extent enhanced the tunneling effect of major shareholders, on the contrary, the non-controlling directors and individual directors could efficiently restrain the tunneling effect. Moreover, the restrain effect of non-controlling directors is even stronger than individual directors. The authors also found that in poor-performance or state-owned companies, non-controlling directors could obviously restrain the tunneling effect; individual directors could efficiently restrain tunneling effect in poor-performance companies, but not in state-owned companies.