摘要
建立基于演化博弈理论与动力学理论相结合的演化博弈模型来探讨工程索赔谈判策略问题,在业主与承包商索赔谈判濒临破裂与双方有限理性的假设条件下,对一般2×2非对称演化博弈过程建立两方复制动态方程,并对其演化博弈过程中的行为分别进行分析,得出双方交互系统的均衡点与稳定性,探索在索赔谈判过程中一般演化规律,对谈判策略的选择提供参考.
In this paper, an evolutionary game model based on evolutionary game theory and dynamics theory is established to discuss the problem of engineering claims negotiation strategy. Under the assumption that the negotiation between the owner and the contractor is on the verge of rupture and the bounded rationality of both sides, the two - dimensional dynamic equation is established for the general 2 × 2 asymmetric evolution game. And then the behavior of the evolutionary game is analysed separately, and the equilibrium point and stability of the interaction system is obtained. The general evolution rule in the negotiation process of the claim is explored, and reference for the choice of the negotiation strategy is provided.
作者
付园园
郑宪强
Fu Yuanyuan Zheng Xianqiang(School of Economics and Management Engineering,Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Beijing 100044)
出处
《北京建筑大学学报》
2017年第3期71-76,共6页
Journal of Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture
基金
北京市教委青年基金项目(ZF15018)
关键词
演化博弈
有限理性
工程索赔
谈判
evolutionary game
bounded rationality
engineering claim
negotiate