代理问题、财务困境与投资——现金流敏感度

Agency Problem,Financial Distress and Investment-cash Flow Sensitivity

基于融资约束理论,探讨了代理问题和财务困境对投资—现金流敏感度的影响。以2010—2014年沪深A股上市公司为样本考察了融资约束、内部现金流与企业投资支出之间的关系,检验结果表明融资约束与投资—现金流敏感度之间呈非线性复杂关系,企业投资支出与内部现金流之间表现出U型非线性关系。进一步研究发现,控股股东代理问题和管理者代理问题可以导致投资—现金流敏感度在低融资约束的情况下反而较大,财务困境可以导致投资—现金流敏感度在高融资约束的情况下反而较小。从代理问题和财务困境的角度丰富了融资约束理论对公司投资行为的分析方法,同时也为优化我国企业投资行为提供一定的理论支持。

Based on the theory of financial constraint,we explore the effects of agency problem and financial distress on investment-cash flow sensitivity.Using a sample of 2010-2014 companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges,we investigate the relationship among financial constraint,internal cash flow and investment spending.The empirical results show that the relation between financial constraint and investment-cash flow sensitivity in China＇s listed companies is in a nonlinear relationship;i.e.,the relation between investment spending and internal cash flow is U-shape nonlinear relationship.Further study shows that under the condition of the low degree of financial constraint,the controlling shareholder agency problem and the manager agency problem are the main reason for non-monotone variation between financing constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivity.In the case of a high degree of financial constraint,financial distress is the main reason for non-monotone variation between financing constraint and investment-cash flow sensitivity.From the angle of agency problems and financial distress,this study not only enriches the theory of financial constraint on analysis method of corporate investment behavior,but also provides certain theoretical support on optimizing the enterprise investment behavior.